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Only the News That's Fit to Print:
Student Expressive Rights in Public
School Communications Media
After Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier
by CHRISTOPHER J. PALERMO*
Introduction
In the past century the United States Supreme Court has
taken strongly contrasting positions on the extent of public
high school students' first amendment rights.' The Court's ef-
forts to fashion a consistent doctrine have been hampered by
changing social notions of the proper purposes of free expres-
sion in schools. 2  Although students have never enjoyed ex-
pressive rights equivalent to those guaranteed adults, the
recent United States Supreme Court case Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier3 signaled a further decline in student free speech
rights.
California has recently become one of few states to offer
students protection greater than the federal constitutional
minimum. California statutes flatly prohibit censorship of stu-
dent expression except in limited, statutorily-defined areas.4
* B.A., Loyola Marymount University, 1986; Member, Third Year Class.
The author dedicates this note to Margaret R. Bucenz, a scholar in her own right
and a constant inspiration.
1. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Compare, e.g., Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a
school district regulation requiring pupils to salute the flag) with Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that barring symbolic
student expression violates the first amendment).
2. For a discussion of court reactions to changing ideas of the function of
schools, see Hafen, Developing Student Expression'Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Institutions, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 670 (1987).
3. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). The Court held that administrative regulations could
be presumed valid. Id. at 571. Previously, an opposite presumption was invoked. See
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
4. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text. California also requires writ-
ten regulations for regulation of any student speech. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West
Supp. 1987); see infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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However, two recent cases reveal that, even in California, stu-
dent expressive rights are limited.5
This Note will examine the current status of high school
students' expressive rights.6 Part I provides an overview of
the parallel development of classroom theory and judicial de-
cisions by the United States and California Supreme Courts.
Part II examines problems--confronted but left unresolved by
the Supreme Court in Hazelwood-caused by application of
traditional constitutional concepts to the high school environ-
ment. Part III discusses Hazelwood. Part IV summarizes the
educational policy underlying the majority opinion. Part V re-
views the California approach to student free expression and
contrasts it with the Hazelwood solution. Part VI applies Ha-
zelwood and California law to specific high school media, ex-
amining problems created by this application. This Note
concludes that Hazelwood was correctly decided, but argues
that the holding is vulnerable to excessively broad interpreta-
tion. It considers problems of overbreadth left unsolved by
Hazelwood and California, and offers a possible solution to the
problems.
I
Evolution of Constitutional Standards of Student
Expression
The evolution of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence related
to student free expression rights has roughly paralleled trends
in educational theory. Early in this century, when schools had
nearly unlimited discretion to design courses and curricula,
the Court endorsed practices which would be considered ex-
treme today.7
5. See Leeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988); Perumal
v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1988).
6. The discussion in this Note is limited to the rights of high school students.
For a brief overview of standards applying to other students, see infra notes 161-73
and accompanying text; Avery & Simpson, The Constitution and Student Publica-
tions: A Comprehensive Approach, 16 J. L. & EDUC. 1, 8-10 (1987); Garvey, Children
and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 321 (1979).
7. For example, in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the
Court upheld a school's authority to expel a student who refused to pledge alle-
giance to the flag. The Court strongly affirmed that educators could "inculcate"
children with majoritarian values. "A society which is dedicated to the preservation
of . . .ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the educational
[Vol. 11:35
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When the U.S. Supreme Court began to expand first amend-
ment freedoms of students, the Court did not initially ac-
knowledge that students possessed rights. The Court instead
supported parents' rights to educate their children as they
wished. 8
The Supreme Court did not render a significant decision in
this area until the Warren Court opened the floodgates with
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District9 in 1969.
Five Iowa high school students wore black armbands to school
to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam, prompting the school
board to pass a rule barring the wearing of armbands.10 The
Supreme Court held that administrators could not restrict this
speech without showing that students wearing armbands
would "materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."'1
getween 1915 and 1970, an evolution similar to that in the
United States Supreme Court occurred in California's courts
process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which bind men together in
a comprehending loyalty ... ." Id. at 600.
However, this view was overruled three years later in West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Gobitis holding was echoed recently in
Board of Educ., Island Trees School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), where the
Court noted that it had "long recognized that local school boards have broad discre-
tion in the management of school affairs," and that "public schools are vitally impor-
tant... as vehicles for inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system." Id. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 76-77 (1979)).
8. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating a statute
requiring schools to teach classes only in English, finding that the statute deprived
parents of liberty to choose education in foreign languages without serving any legit-
imate state interest); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a
statute requiring students to attend public schools, reasoning, as in Meyer, that the
statute deprived parents of liberty without due process, since it made education com-
pulsory but did not allow students to attend private schools).
These cases do not represent judicial recognition of students' rights to direct their
own education. The decisions declare that the state acts as a surrogate parent in
educational matters, and that parents' roles in choosing specific curricula is limited.
Indeed, after striking down the statute in Meyer, the Court carefully noted that state
power "to prescribe a curriculum" in any form "is not questioned." 262 U.S. at 402.
See also McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (1966)). This phrase has
been adopted almost universally as the threshold test for student press censorship.
However, the Supreme Court in Hazelwood recently suggested that the test has been
misinterpreted. See infra note 91.
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and legislature.12 An early decision upheld a school district's
expulsion of a student who mildly criticized his principal."3 In
1969 Tinker was decided and the California Legislature re-
sponded by enacting Education Code section 10611 in 1971,
granting broad press freedom to students. 4 A challenge to
this statute soon advanced to the California Supreme Court,
which upheld Section 10611 as applied to a non-school-spon-
sored newspaper in Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School
District.5
Less than a month after Bright was handed down, California
Education Code section 48907 [hereinafter section 48907] was
adopted in its final form." No cases were decided under sec-
tion 48907 for ten years.1 7 However, sixteen days after Hazel-
wood was issued, the California Court of Appeals decided two
cases interpreting section 48907 for the first time. 18
The first appellate decision to apply Hazelwood to California
schools was Leeb v. DeLong.'9 The court of appeals upheld ad-
ministrative censorship of a high school newspaper if authori-
ties demonstrably risked tort liability by distributing the
paper."0 In Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dis-
trict,21 decided the same day as Leeb, the appeals court upheld
a school regulation prohibiting publication and distribution of
religious material by off-campus groups.22 The court held that
12. Under California Education Code § 48907, prior restraint and prior review
are permitted; the prior restraint provisions were recently held constitutional in the
first case to challenge them. See e.g. Leeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1988).
13. Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915).
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10611 (West 1972) (repealed 1977).
15. 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1976).
16. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). See irfra text accompanying
notes 105-06 for full text of the statute. For an argument urging repeal of these
provisions, see Note, Prior Restraint and the Public High School Student Press: The
Validity of Administrative Censorship of Student Newspapers Under the Federal
and California Constitutions, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1055, 1078-98 (1987) [hereinafter
Prior Restraint Note].
17. Hinze v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 174 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1981),
referred to § 48907 generally while deciding the case on other grounds; Bright v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist., 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1976)
(construed a statutory predecessor of § 48907). See infra notes 114-73 and accompa-
nying text.
18. The opinions were issued Jan. 29, 1988.
19. 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
20. Id. at 58-59, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
21. 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988).
22. Id. at 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
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student free speech rights under section 48907 must yield to
the establishment clause of the federal constitution.23
The evolving constitutional doctrine of students' expressive
rights reveals a basic philosophical tension between two views
of the school's role in education. The first view is that schools
should indoctrinate pupils by teaching majoritarian values and
the limits of socially appropriate behavior with limited free
expression. The second view is that schools should provide a
forum for intellectual experimentation which mildly incul-
cates social values by encouraging free expression. The debate
centers on whether constitutional freedoms should fully ex-
tend to students, or be withheld until students mature.24 An-
swering these questions requires an examination of how first
amendment principles should apply in the school
environment.
II
Problems Applying Constitutional Principles and
Professional Media Concepts to the
School Environment
The compulsory public school in America is an institution
which must balance at least three competing interests: par-
ents' interest in educating children according to personal
moral and intellectual standards, the child's interest in prepar-
ing for the future, and the state's interest in educating its citi-
zenry.25 The school system must mediate21 to serve all three
interests. Consequently, schools do not fit easily into constitu-
23. The establishment clause of the first amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law ... respecting an establishment of religion...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 74-75,
243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 555-56 (1988).
24. Voting, for example, is a constitutional right reserved for citizens aged 18
and over. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. Society recognizes the value of teaching
students about the rights they will assume at adulthood, but judges that such teach-
ing should precede granting the right. See generally Hafen, supra note 2.
25. A full discussion of the tension between parental and state rights is beyond
the scope of this Note. See Buchanan, The Evolution of Parental Rights in Educa-
tion, 16 J. L. & EDUC. 339 (1987).
26. "Mediating structures" cushion the individual's collisions with societal struc-
tures such as government and workplace. Mediating structures include families,
churches, schools, and neighborhoods. See Hafen, supra note 2, at 696 (discussing P.
BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUC-
TURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977)).
19881
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tional doctrine designed for other institutions.27 Traditional
constitutional jurisprudence makes assumptions-about the
media, its audience, and the exchange of ideas between the
two-which are inapplicable to schools. The following sections
examine some of these assumptions and show the difficulty of
applying them to schools.
A. Is a Student Newspaper a Public Forum?2"
Schools are categorically different from traditional public
forums such as parks, streets, -and gathering places which,
"time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing pub-
lic questions. ' 29 Schools differ from these forums because
school classes are controlled environments which, unlike
parks, are not open to the public. Once on campus, students
are subject to many restrictions on behavior. Organized pres-
entation and discussion of ideas is critical to effective educa-
tion, and this process is severely hampered if many speakers
and ideas compete for attention as they may in a true "public
forum."
Student media, part of this controlled environment, cannot
be characterized as traditional public forums. An examination
27. Other restricted environments have proven similarly troublesome. Justice
Kaus of the California Supreme Court expressed frustration applying press free-
doms to prison newspapers, calling them "sui generis [which] will not fit into the
standard first amendment mold." Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 930, 654 P.2d 758,
774, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575, 591 (1982) (Kaus, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
28. The concept of the public forum evolved from a series of Supreme Court
decisions beginning in 1965. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 12-24 (2d ed. 1988). The Court provided its best summary of the doctrine to
date in Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 37 (1983),
identifying three distinct classes of forums: true public forums, such as streets and
parks; "limited public forums," including public property which the state has opened
for use by the public for expressive activity; and "private forums," such as public
property "which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication." Id. at 45-46.
Regulations restricting the content of messages expressed in public forums and
limited public forums are subject to strict scrutiny. Non-content-based restrictions
on the time, place, and manner of expression within such forums are constitutionally
valid if they (1) are narrowly tailored to serve a reasonable government purpose, and
(2) leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. L. TRIBE, supra at
986-87. The government may regulate private forums in any reasonable manner. Id.
In a later decision, the Court refined its criteria by announcing that clear
government intent to permit public discussion is required to convert a government-
owried private forum into even a limited public forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); see infra note 76.
29. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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of a student newspaper, a traditional student medium, illus-
trates this point at two levels. First, the student newspaper is
a non-public forum. Typical school newspapers do not hold
their pages out as accessible to the public. The very nature of
editorial discretion precludes free public access, since editors
must select stories from those available from students in order
to fit constraints of time, space, and taste. Furthermore, par-
ticipation in a student-produced newspaper is generally lim-
ited to student contributors; off-campus groups are denied
access.3 0 Consequently, at this level the paper fails to qualify
as a public forum under Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators Association."A
The newspaper also fails as an intra-school public forum be-
cause of control exercised by the school administration. The
newspaper might appear public since it is an organization open
to all students and circulated throughout the campus. How-
ever, if school authorities determine the newspaper's budget
and choose its editorial staff, administrators are not demon-
strating intent to provide open access, which is required to
classify a forum as public under Perry as refined by Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.32 Therefore,
even when considered only within the school setting, school
newspapers must be considered "private forums" under
Perry.33
Since student media do not fit the concept of the public fo-
rum under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, full first
30. However, the intent of the institution creating the publication may be criti-
cal. The Ninth Circuit recently held that a school district's regulations indicated
intent to open a school newspaper as a limited public forum; consequently, off-cam-
pus groups desiring to place advertisements could not be denied access to the forum
on the basis of content. San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Gov-
erning Bd. of the Grossmont School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). For a sum-
mary of the application of the public forum doctrine to high schools, focusing on
Grossmont, see Note, San Diego Committee Against Registration and the Draft v.
Governing Board of the Grossmont School District: Public Forum Analysis in the
High School Context, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 23 (1987) (Ninth Circuit survey).
31. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Regulations of access to such forums require only reason-
ableness. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 986-87. Editorial discretion is a reasonable
means of regulation, serving the legitimate government purpose of teaching students
the skills of journalism. Therefore, the public forum doctrine is applicable to stu-
dent media only restrictively, considering the limited environment of the school.
32. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). See also supra note 28.
33. Professor Tribe has complained that Cornelius turns this analysis on its
head, because it allows administrative or governmental action to determine whether
a forum is free or closed-exactly the kind of decision government should not be
allowed to make in American society. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 996.
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amendment protection cannot be extended to student journal-
ists on this basis.
B. Are student newspapers legally analogous to professional
media?
The comparison between sttident and professional media is
an imperfect one. For example, because public school students
are typically insolvent, they have no economic incentive to
avoid defamation. Of course, responsible student journalists
understand that their reputation for factual accuracy will suf-
fer if they regularly publish false, scurrilous materials. How-
ever, even a professional reporter has no constitutional right
to insist upon publication of an article whether or not it meets
the publisher's standards of journalism;34 the publisher has
unfettered freedom to censor .3  The policy behind these
precepts is easily understood. Since the publisher may be held
responsible in a defamation action for anything he publishes,36
he must have discretion to choose whether to print an item.
School administrators may be analogized to publishers: they
provide money and facilities for student publications, and may
be held liable for articles published. Student participants
must expect to answer to school authorities and cannot expect
absolute freedom to publish.
Unlike private publishers, the public school is an arm of the
state with the capacity to indoctrinate students with ideas .3
Students in a school are the ultimate captive audience. 9
Therefore, while recognizing that schools legitimately exist to
34. "[T]he constitutional right of free speech has never been thought to embrace
a right to require a journalist or any other citizen to listen to a person's views, let
alone a right to require a publisher to publish those views in his newspaper .... "
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1974). Nor do persons willing to pay for space
have a constitutional right of access to the publication. See, e.g., Associates & Al-
drich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
35. "[Compelling editors] to publish that which, '"reason" tells them should not
be published' is unconstitutional." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974) (quoting Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1944)).
36. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 797-812 (5th ed. 1984). See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation action arising
from paid political advertisement).
37. Courts are split on the wisdom of imposing such liability. See Note, infra
note 62 and accompanying text.
38. One commentator suggests that this model is inaccurate, and that schools
actually serve as unique "mediating institutions" between the individual and the
state. See Hafen, supra note 2, at 695.
39. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court found that
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socialize and inculcate community values, courts have erected
barriers to prevent schools from promulgating only one
viewpoint.4"
School newspapers are not true public forums, nor are they
legally analogous to professional media. Consequently, courts
and commentators have had to balance student free speech
and school educational goals. The Hazelwood Court faced this
tension, and struck a precarious balance between the two.
41
III
The Hazelwood Decision
A. Facts and Background
Spectrum was the student-produced newspaper at Hazel-
wood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri.42 Students en-
rolled in the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East wrote and
edited the paper, under the close supervision of a faculty advi-
sor, Howard Emerson. 43 One-fourth of the paper's cost was
recouped through sales of the paper, and the other three-
fourths was contributed by the school board.44 Emerson
served as managing editor. His duties included selecting arti-
cles, assigning reporters, reviewing stories edited by students,
designing the paper, and managing its finances. 45 Emerson
also submitted page proofs to the principal, Robert Reynolds,
for his review immediately before publication.46
On May 10, 1984, Emerson submitted proofs of the May 13
edition to Reynolds, who objected to two articles. 47 One story
a regulation restricting academic freedom was a violation of the first amendment
because the classroom should be a "marketplace of ideas." Id. at 603.
40. Thus, a school may not cast a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom by se-
lective removal of the school library's books. Id. at 603.
41. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 (1988). See infra notes 74-88 and
accompanying text.
42. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 565.
43. Id. Emerson served as adviser at the time that the case arose. However,
Emerson had replaced the previous adviser only ten days before. Emerson was ap-
parently unfamiliar with the paper's operation, but Hazelwood's principal neverthe-
less relied on Emerson for information about the paper's pending deadlines, leading
the principal to censor the paper more severely than he may have wanted to. Id. at
566.
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id. at 568 (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450,
1453 (E.D. Mo. 1985)).
46. 108 S. Ct. at 565.
47. Id.
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used fictitious names to refer to three pregnant Hazelwood
students, and the other dealt with the effect of divorce on stu-
dents.4" Reynolds thought that despite the use of false names,
the students described in the pregnancy article might be iden-
tifiable.49 He also felt the article's description of promiscuity
and birth control was not suitable for the school's younger stu-
dents." Finally, Reynolds believed the divorce story did not
meet standards of fair journalism, because a student named in
the story accused her father of being inattentive and abusive,
but the father had not been given an opportunity to respond.51
Relying on Emerson for guidance about the timing of publi-
cation and preproduction work, Reynolds believed he had no
time to modify the offending stories, and that he must either
cut the entire two pages on which the stories appeared or
withhold the whole issue from publication. 2 He chose what
he considered the less drastic option, and told Emerson to cut
the two pages.5 3
Three months after Reynolds' action, three Spectrum staff
members54 brought suit in United States District Court. The
students sought a declaration that Reynolds' actions violated
their first amendment right to freedom of speech, an injunc-
tion barring Reynolds from further censorship,5 5 and mone-
tary damages. 6
B. Lower Court Holdings
1. District Court Ruling
In May 1985, the district court denied the students money
damages and declared that no constitutional violation had oc-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 565-66.
51. Id. at 566.
52. Id. The Court found that Reynolds' reliance on Emerson was reasonable. Id.
at 572.
53. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1459 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
54. Plaintiffs did not write the articles in question, but did prepare them for
publication. Id. at 1451.
55. The claim for injunctive relief was dismissed by the District Court as moot,
since plaintiffs had graduated from school. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist.,
596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1984). Plaintiffs revised their pleadings and refiled, but
lost their claims for declaratory relief and money damages. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
56. 607 F. Supp. at 1450.
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curred.57 The court reviewed federal cases deciding free
speech issues in the high school arena and divided them into
two groups: those striking down restrictions on extracurricu-
lar, non-school-sponsored speech, and those upholding admin-
istrative regulation of school-sponsored speech integral to the
educational program of the school.58  The court sanctioned
Reynolds' decision, finding that Spectrum was a curricular ac-
tivity closely bound to classroom instruction which could not
be considered a public forum.59 As a result, the court upheld
Reynolds' decision as permissible administrative regulation of
school-sponsored speech. The court, however, noted that ad-
ministrators do not have unfettered discretion and must
ground their decisions on a "reasonable basis.., based on the
facts before them at the time of the conduct in question."6 In
so ruling, the court gave great deference to Reynolds' decision
under the circumstances. 61 The court focused on Reynolds'
fear that the intrusion caused by the teenage pregnancy article
might constitute an "invasion of the rights of others," one of
the factors allowing administrators to exercise prior restraint,
according to Tinker.62 The court also held that since Spectrum
was a curricular activity, Reynolds was entitled to delete the
article on divorce because it did not meet acceptable standards
of journalistic fairness.63
2. Eighth Circuit Opinion
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, declaring that
Spectrum was a public forum and that the articles deleted by
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1462-63.
59. Id. at 1465.
60. Id. at 1466 (citing Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (up-
holding censorship of unverified letter to the editor)).
61. 607 F. Supp. at 1466.
62. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)). Tinker declared that "conduct by the student ... which ... involves ...
invasion of the rights of others is ... not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech." 393 U.S. at 513. See, e.g., Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1052 (uphold-
ing censorship of an unsubstantiated letter charging that a student had been sus-
pended from school); Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th
Cir. 1986); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 625, 640 (1984).
In rejecting the application of Tinker to the Hazelwood facts, the Supreme Court
in Hazelwood expressly avoided the question of whether tort liability is the proper
threshold for permissible prior restraints. 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 n.5 (1988).
63. 607 F. Supp. at 1466-67.
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Reynolds did not meet the Tinker test for permitted prior re-
straint.64 The court found that the school administration in-
tended to create a public forum, because Spectrum "operated
as a conduit for student viewpoint. ' 65  Conceding that the
faculty advisor exercised close control over the newspaper, the
Eighth Circuit nevertheless found that the paper's editorial
policy statement, opinions expressed in the paper, and school
board policy manifested intent to create a public forum.66
The court then applied the Tinker mandate to invalidate
any prior restraint. The court noted that Hazelwood officials
did not claim their action was required to avoid interference
with school work or discipline, leaving the court to decide only
whether the stories would constitute an "invasion of the rights
of others. '68  The court adopted an analysis suggested in a law
review article and held that only material exposing the school
to tort liability could be restrained.69 Concluding that no tort
action could result from publication of the articles, the court
held that the censorship was not justified. °
Circuit Judge Wollman dissented, arguing that labeling a
school-sponsored, faculty-controlled newspaper a public forum
"pits students against school officials in a battle for control
64. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
Tinker permits prior restraint if the expression invades the rights of others or causes
a material disruption of the educational process. See supra note 62 and accompany-
ing text. For an argument that the Eighth Circuit erroneously applied the public
forum doctrine, see Note, Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District: Application of
the Prior Restraint and Public Forum Doctrines to the Free Expression Rights of
High School Students, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 889 (1987).
65. 795 F.2d at 1372.
66. Id. at 1372-73.
67. Id. at 1374. See supra note 62.
68. 795 F.2d at 1375.
69. Id. at 1376. See Note, supra note 62, at 640. The author of the Note argues
that "invasion of the rights of others" should refer to tortious acts only, because a
looser standard would allow censorship of marginally offensive or critical state-
ments, chilling speech without protecting any legally recognized interest. Id. The
tort liability standard was rejected in a New York case brought by a plaintiff alleg-
edly libeled by editors of a school-funded, unsupervised collegiate publication. See
Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1981). See also Ryan, The First
Amendment on Campus: The Right of the Student Press v. The Rights of the Student,
14 J. C. & U. L. 505, 514-16 (discussing Mazart and other liability theories).
In later cases, Eighth Circuit judges have disagreed with this rationale. Senior
Circuit Judge Henley asserted in a 1987 case that the true reason schools have
adopted the tort liability standard is protection of children, not avoidance of tort
liability. Bystrom v. Fridley High School, Indep. School Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747,
758 n.1 (8th Cir. 1987).
70. 795 F.2d at 1376.
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over what is rightfully within the province of school offi-
cials.""' The dissent maintained that courts should defer to
school officials on curriculum questions. Judge Wollman com-
plained that the majority's tort liability standard would be im-
practical for schools unable to afford counsel to determine
whether publication could lead to liability.72 Hazelwood ad-
ministrators appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 7
C. Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit. 4 With
Justice White writing for five justices, the Court first reviewed
historical limits on student constitutional rights. After reaf-
firming Tinker's declaration that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate," the Court noted
that students' rights have never equalled those of adults, and
that school officials need not tolerate expression inconsistent
with the basic educational mission and structure of the
school.75
The majority considered whether Spectrum could be a con-
stitutionally protected public forum. Reviewing the "govern-
mental intent" test developed in Cornelius,76 the Court held
there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate administrative
intent to open Spectrum as a public forum.77 "A decision to
71. Id. at 1378 (Wollman, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1379.
73. 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
74. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id.
75. Id. at 567.
76. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). In Cornelius, the Court summarized cases evaluating
public forums and concluded that government creates a public forum in a nontradi-
tional setting only by specific intentional acts. Government intent may be revealed
by policy and practice, the nature of the property and its compatibility with expres-
sive activity, and the historical use of the forum. Id. at 802-06.
77. 108 S. Ct. at 568-69. For example, both the principal and the School Board
clearly stated they intended the paper as a classroom exercise integral to the curric-
ulum. The faculty advisor had total control over the paper's operation, and fre-
quently made editorial decisions without consulting students. The Court rejected
the Eighth Circuit's reliance on the paper's Statement of Policy, which asserted:
Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution .... This right ... was
clarified in the Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District case in
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teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity,"
the Court said, "hardly implies a decision to relinquish school
control over that activity. '78
Having declined to label Spectrum a public forum, the Court
held that Tinker did not apply to sponsored activities and an-
nounced that authorities could regulate the paper in any rea-
sonable manner.79 The Court distinguished Tinker on the
grounds that requiring administrators to tolerate student
speech is not equal to forcing schools to affirmatively promote
speech.° In Tinker, the Court held that school authorities
cannot restrict the expression of non-school-sponsored speech
which happens to occur on school grounds.81 The Hazelwood
Court distinguished school-sponsored activities as creating an
impression that the school endorses the views expressed. 2
The Court found that schools have a right to disassociate
themselves from objectionable speech which "students, par-
ents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school. '83
The Court analogized the school to a newspaper publisher
entitled to exercise control over material to which it lends fa-
cilities and resources.84 Furthermore, the Court said, a
school's educational mission entitles it to set higher standards
for student publications than exist in the "real world." Fi-
nally, schools must be given the discretion to determine when
published material is inappropriate for immature students. To
1969. The Supreme Court ... ruled that... only speech that 'materially and
substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline'
can be found unacceptable and therefore prohibited.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1455 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (em-
phasis added).
The Court said the statement did not reveal intent to give full first amendment
protection to students-but only that authorities intended not to violate first amend-
ment rights as applied restrictively in the context of the school environment. 108 S.
Ct. at 569. The Court rejected as inaccurate the interpretation of Tinker italicized
above. Id. at 569 n.2.
78. 108 S. Ct. at 569.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Court explicitly left intact Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667
(1973) (per curiam) (invalidating administrative regulation of an "underground" stu-
dent newspaper). The Tinker standard applied to Papish, the Hazelwood Court rea-
soned, because the "underground" paper was non-sponsored speech analagous to the
Tinker armbands. 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.3.
81. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
82. 108 S. Ct. at 569.
83. Id. at 569-70.
84. Id. at 570.
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abrogate that discretion, the Court said, would reduce the
school's ability to teach limits of socially appropriate behavior.
The Hazelwood Court reaffirmed its committment to giving
substantial deference in free speech matters to school officials
rather than courts.8 5 To achieve these objectives, the Court
held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of stu-
dent speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."86 The Court applied this new rule and found that
Principal Reynolds' two decisions-to delete two objectionable
articles, and to remove two full pages rather than just the two
articles-were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.
8 7
The Court found that Reynolds' decision to delete the arti-
cles could be justified both by his concern for sensitive topics
in the high school environment and his feeling that the arti-
cles did not meet proper standards of journalism.8 These
judgments, the Court said, fell well within Reynolds' authority
to make basic curricular decisions. Reynolds also acted rea-
sonably in deleting two pages rather than just two articles, due
to time pressure and a recently-installed journalism adviser
who may not have known less severe editing was feasible.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan filed a stinging dissent, countering almost
every conclusion of law the majority had made.89 Ignoring
whether school authorities intentionally created a public fo-
85. Id. at 571. The Court reserved the question of whether the same degree of
deference should apply at different educational levels. Id. at 571 n.7. This suggests
that elementary schools, secondary schools, and colleges may exist along a contin-
uum giving less deference to administrative decisions as the age and maturity of the
students increase. For a discussion of the relationship of educational levels and first
amendment freedom, see Hafen, supra note 2, at 702-09.
86. 108 S. Ct. at 571. In fashioning this standard, the Court rejected the students'
argument that administrators should be allowed to censor school-sponsored publica-
tions only pursuant to specific written regulations. Such regulations, the Court said,
"in the context of a curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of educa-
tors to educate." Id. at 570 n.6. However, the Court reserved the question of
whether written regulations are required before authorities may regulate non-
school-sponsored speech, which is given broader first amendment protection by the
Papish Court's application of Tinker. Id.
87. Id. at 571-72.
88. Id. at 572.
89. Id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rum, Brennan focused on Tinker's traditional interpretation
and asserted that Tinker should apply to all student expres-
sion.90 Justice Brennan claimed the majority's separation of
student speech into sponsored and non-sponsored categories
ignored the Court's recent application of Tinker in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.9 Justice Brennan called for
the continued viability of Tinker, asserting that it could be
read broadly by courts to enable administrators to effect the
"pedagogical concerns" emphasized by the majority.92 For ex-
ample, the dissent suggested, an administrator could censor a
poorly-written news article because a court could find that bad
grammar constituted a "material disruption" of the "newspa-
per's curricular purpose.' 93
Justice Brennan's greatest fear was that the majority's hold-
ing could permit administrators to censor any expression with
little justification.94 "[T]he state educator's ... undeniably vi-
tal.., mandate to inculcate moral and political values is not a
general warrant to act as 'thought police,'" wrote Justice
Brennan.95
Finally, the dissent argued that the school could disassociate
itself from ideas in the newspaper using means less restrictive
than censorship, such as printing a disclaimer, publishing an
opposing viewpoint, or limiting the paper's content to certain
90. Id. at 575.
91. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). In his Hazelwood dissent, Brennan noted that in Fra-
ser, the Court upheld administrators' decision to discipline a student for indecent
expression occurring at an "assembly [which] was part of a school-sponsored educa-
tional program in self-government" because the decision passed the Tinker test. 108
S. Ct. at 575 (quoting Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3162) (emphasis added). The Hazelwood
majority rejected this analysis, noting that Fraser dealt with offensive speech rather
than speech allegedly constituting a "material disruption" of classwork. 108 S. Ct. at
570 n.4.
92. 108 S. Ct. at 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 574. This concern may not be wholly without merit. The day after
Hazelwood was handed down, a San Francisco Bay Area principal censored an article
merely because it dealt with AIDS. Taylor, Court Ruling Stirs Flap at Bay Area
School, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 14, 1988, at All, col. 1. In ensuing months, ad-
ministrators at four junior college campuses have censored student publications even
though Hazelwood is explicitly limited to high school publications. See O'Keeffe, Af-
ter Hazelwood, More Campus Officials Trying to Muzzle Student Papers, Press Re-
lease No. 58, COLLEGE PRESS SERVICE, April 25, 1988, at 6, reprinted in the Mills
College Weekly, May 6, 1988, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter O'Keeffe]; see generally STU-
DENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 1988.
95. 108 S. Ct. at 577 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 11:35
EXPRESSIVE RIGHTS IN SCHOOL MEDIA
educational topics. 96 The majority responded to this point in a
footnote, stating that schools could also exercise discretion and
choose not to publish a paper at all, rather than permit ob-
scenity or become immersed in a debate about a controversial
topic. Indeed, the majority contended that this alternative is
so attractive that adopting the dissent's view might lead, ironi-
cally, to a chilling of speech.9 7 These alternatives were not ad-
dressed by the majority, but they need not have been, since in
the majority view such choices should not be made by judges
but should instead be left to the discretion of school officials.
98
D. The Educational Theory Underlying Hazelwood
The Hazelwood decision is based on several value judgments
about the role of schools in society. First, the majority clearly
reaffirmed that the degree of constitutionally permissible
school-imposed restriction of rights varies with a student's
age. 99 The Court, however, refused to draw a bright line divid-
ing "children" from "adults," and left open the question of
whether children should be classified into subgroups by age
for constitutional purposes.100
Second, the Court resurrected a constitutional presumption
that high school administrators validly exercise their authority
in supervising curricular activities. 10 1 This reflects a judgment
that school authorities require great deference to educate, tip-
ping the balance from inculcation toward indoctrination at the
risk of presenting only the state's viewpoint.0 2
Finally, the Court determined that the school's role as "pub-
96. Id. at 579.
97. Id. at 572 n.9.
98. Id. at 571.
99. Id. at 567.
100. Id. at 571 n.7. After Hazelwood, protection of children is valid justification
for administrative censorship. Lower federal courts agree. See Williams v. Spencer,
622 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (4th Cir. 1980) (principal may ban school newspaper ad pro-
moting sale of drug paraphernalia because it encourages drug use which may endan-
ger students' health); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(upholding prior restraint of newspaper which planned to print libelous letter which
could cause irreparable harm to student).
101. 108 S. Ct. at 570-71.
102. "[T]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of par-
ents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges ....
Only when the decision to censor .. .has no valid educational purpose [is] the First
Amendment so 'directly and sharply implicate[d]' . . . as to require judicial interven-
tion." 108 S. Ct. at 571 (quoting Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. School
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982)) (citations omitted).
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lisher" removes school-sponsored student media from the pro-
tected class of "public forums," thereby freeing administrators
from the strictures of Tinker.103 This choice reflects a judg-
ment that the school-sponsored newspaper serves primarily as
a curricular tool rather than as a perfect analogue to a "real-
world" paper.
IV
Comparison of the Hazelwood Standard to the
California Standard
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.°4 defines the minimum first
amendment protection available to high school students
throughout the nation. California is one of only two states
which has expanded student press rights beyond those an-
nounced by the Court."°5 California Education Code section
48907 provides:
[1.] Students of the public schools shall have the right to
exercise freedom of speech and of the press including, but not
limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of
printed materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges,
and other insignia, and the right of expression in official pub-
lications, whether or not such publications or other means of
expression are supported financially by the school or by use of
school facilities, except that expression shall be prohibited
which is obscene, libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall
be material which so incites students as to create a clear and
present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school
premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the
substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
[2.] Each governing board of a school district and each
county board of education shall adopt rules and regulations in
the form of a written publications code, which shall include
reasonable provisions for the time, place, and manner of con-
ducting such activities within its respective jurisdiction.
[3.] Student editors of official school publications shall be
103. 108 S. Ct. at 570-71.
104. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
105. Massachusetts led the way by passing an act entitled Rights of Students to
Freedom of Expression. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 71, § 82 (West 1982). But a later legisla-
ture made the provision optional when it enacted § 86 in 1974. Id. at § 86. On July
14, 1988, the state removed impediments to enforcement of § 82. MASS. GEN. L. ch.
71, § 86 (Supp. 1988). See State Salvation, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Vol.
9, No. 3, Fall 1988, at 3-5.
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responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and
feature content of their publications subject to the limitations
of this section. However, it shall be the responsibility of a
journalism adviser or advisers of student publications within
each school to supervise the production of the student staff, to
maintain professional standards of English and journalism,
and to maintain the provisions of this section.
[4.] There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared
for official school publications except insofar as it violates this
section. School officials shall have the burden of showing jus-
tification without undue delay prior to any limitation of stu-
dent expression under this section.
[5.] "Official school publications" refers to material pro-
duced by students in the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or
writing classes and distributed to the student body either free
or for a fee.' °6
As is evident, the statutory rights granted by California dif-
fer from those guaranteed by Hazelwood in several respects.
A. California Court Reactions to Hazelwood
Sixteen days after Hazelwood was announced, the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District decided two cases re-
vealing the effect of Hazelwood on section 48907.107 The cases
indicate that although student press freedom in California re-
mains broad, California courts may rely on Hazelwood to jus-
tify censorship in some circumstances.
1. Actionable Defamation Justifies Censorship: Leeb v.
DeLong 0 8
The Fourth District first considered post-publication restric-
tions placed on David Leeb, who served as student editor of
the school newspaper at Rancho Alamitos High School in
southern California.109 For the paper's April Fool spoof issue,
Leeb prepared an article headlined "Nude Photos: Girls of
Rancho." According to the article, Playboy magazine planned
to feature nude pictures of female Rancho students in a future
issue. The article was accompanied by a photo purportedly
106. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987) (paragraph enumeration added).
107.. Leeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988); Perumal v.
Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1988).
108. 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
109. Id. at 50, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
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showing five unnamed but identifiable Rancho girls lined up
outside the school darkroom awaiting their turns to sign up
for a photo session.110 The school principal recognized each
student in the photo.
Rancho's principal, James DeLong, spoke with the father of
one of the girls pictured. According to DeLong, the father ex-
pressed shock and outrage and threatened legal action.1 1 ' The
principal interviewed each of the girls and determined that
although the girls agreed to be photographed for the school
paper, they did not consent to the use of the headline that was
printed." 2 On April 2 the principal stopped distribution of the
paper."13
Leeb ignored avenues of appeal available within the school
and instead challenged the constitutionality of the principal's
action, claiming the prior restraint allowed by section 48907
violated the California Constitution." 4 After failing to obtain a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, Leeb
lost the suit on a motion for summary judgment and appealed.
The appellate panel held that since California gives greater
constitutional protection to students than does the first
amendment, Hazelwood was inapplicable; only section 48907
and state court decisions control free expression questions in-
volving California students." 5 The court relied, reluctantly,
on Bailey v. Loggins, 116 in which the California Supreme
Court held that content restrictions on state prison newspa-
pers violate the California Constitution." 7 The Bailey court
had rejected the argument that the state, acting as publisher
of the prison paper, could exercise regulation as stringent as a
110. Id.
111. Id. at 50-51, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
112. Id. at 50, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
113. Id. at 51, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
114. Id. Although the court did not address the issue, plaintiff Leeb was actually
a victim of post-publication censorship, not prior restraint. Therefore, Leeb techni-
cally may not have had standing to challenge section 48907's prior restraint bar.
115. Id. at 54-55, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
116. 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982). The Leeb court ques-
tioned the continued viability of Bailey in light of Hazelwood, since Bailey is
grounded primarily on federal authority at least partially overruled by Hazelwood.
Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 55, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 498. The Leeb court felt constrained to
follow Bailey in the absence of contrary instruction from the California Supreme
Court, but it noted three times that if it could have written on a clean slate, it would
have ruled differently in Leeb. Id. at 55-56, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
117. 32 Cal. 3d at 919, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
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private publisher.118 The Bailey court found the prison's regu-
lations indicated an intent to open the paper as a limited pub-
lic forum which could not be subjected to arbitrary
censorship. 19 Finally, the Bailey majority rejected the argu-
ment that the need for discipline in a prison environment,
standing alone, could justify the imposition of censorship.120
The Leeb court held that the Rancho Alamitos paper, like
that in Bailey, was a limited public forum. 21 The Leeb court,
like the Bailey court, held that the government's right to cen-
sor its own publications is not unlimited.1 22 Furthermore, the
Leeb court said, section 48907 implicitly indicates school papers
are limited forums.
23
The court then considered the extent of the government's
limited privilege of censorship in the high school setting.
1 24
Echoing the Eighth Circuit in Hazelwood, the court held that
administrators may censor only material that is actually tor-
tious; mere suspicion or the possibility of exposing the school
to tort liability is insufficient to justify censorship or prior re-
straint under the California Constitution. 25 No prior restraint
may occur, the court held, unless a plaintiff would have a clear
chance of prevailing in an action against the school.126 How-
ever, aware that such a standard presents difficulties, the
court offered further guidance by noting that to censor,
schools should determine that publication would be "likely to
harm the reputation of another or hold that person up to
shame, ridicule, or humiliation.1 127 By articulating a narrow
118. Id. "[T]he state, having established an activity which has the elements of
free expression, must take account of first amendment considerations in restricting
that expression." Id. (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 918-19, 654 P.2d at 765-66, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
120. Id. at 918, 654 P.2d at 765-66, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Three justices dissented,
disagreeing with the subjective judgments made by the majority. Ultimately, the
dissent concluded that both its approach and that of the majority were inherently
inadequate because "the type of prison newspaper permitted by the department is
sui generis and simply will not fit into the standard first amendment mold." Id. at
930, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591. (Kaus, J., dissenting).
121. 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 56, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 57, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
124. Id. at 60-62, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
125. Id. at 60, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
126. Id. at 62, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
127. Id. The principal concern is that schools would need to consult counsel
before imposing prior restraints. The court chose a narrow standard favoring stu-
dent publishers, not to assuage students' fear that a "potential tort liability" test
would be a "license to kill," but to place the parties "in the same situation with
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standard, the court sought to avoid forcing schools into the
labyrinth of modern defamation law.
The facts of Leeb are remarkably similar to those of Hazel-
wood. Both cases involved depictions of students who were
not identified but who were recognized by administrators. In
both cases courts considered adoption of a tort liability stan-
dard for restricting speech. But while the Hazelwood majority
rejected this test, the Fourth District adopted it, acknowledg-
ing the liberal mandate of section 48907 and balancing student
expression with plaintiffs' privacy rights.
2. Establishment Clause Supersedes Section 48907:
Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School
District 128
In the second Fourth District case to consider the implica-
tions of Hazelwood, the court held that where student press
rights conflict with some superseding constitutional concerns,
student expressive rights must yield. 129 In Perumal, the court
held that a public high school operating as a private forum
could not allow a student religious club to distribute flyers on
campus or place advertisements in the yearbook.3 0
Alexander Perumal organized a student group, New Life,
which was active at El Toro High School in Orange County,
California.131 Perumal and other students gathered informally
outside during the lunch recess to study the Bible and pray.
Perumal requested school approval to distribute a flyer to stu-
dents announcing New Life meetings; the request was denied.
Frederick Read, student leader of a New Life chapter at Mis-
sion Viejo High School, similarly asked his principal to ap-
respect to allegedly defamatory material as private litigants in a court of law." Id. at
61-62, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03. The analogy to private litigation may not be entirely
appropriate. In the "real world," the parties to litigation would be the publisher and
the defamed plaintiff. In the school context, to use the court's analogy, equivalent
parties are the school administration and the student journalist; the defamed individ-
ual is only the subject of the controversy, not a party. Id. at 58, 243 Cal. Rptr at 500.
This requires the school to stand in the place of the potential plaintiff and determine
whether the plaintiff would be defamed. This is probably not feasible for most
schools, especially if situations requiring advice of counsel arise frequently. A school
in such a position might err on the side of safety to avoid liability, chilling student
speech despite the court's effort to avoid that result.
128. 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 74-75, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
131. Id. at 67, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
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prove a paid New Life advertisement slated to appear in the
school yearbook, and this request was also denied. Perumal
and Read petitioned for a writ of mandate in superior court,
seeking an order commanding the school district to allow dis-
tribution of the flyers and permit publication of the yearbook
advertisement.'32 The petition was denied without comment,
and the students appealed.
In a terse opinion, the appellate court affirmed, holding that
the high wall between church and state erected by the United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence could not be chipped
away by section 48907."' The majority discussed section 48907
only briefly, holding that while the statute extends broad free
speech rights to students, it also permits administrators to reg-
ulate student speech under some circumstances.3
Judge Crosby, who wrote the majority opinion in Leeb, filed
a sharp dissent to Perumal, arguing that the religious adver-
tisements struck down by the majority met none of the crite-
ria for acceptable prior restraint enumerated in section
48907.111 The majority sidestepped this contention by holding
that establishment clause concerns override any effect of sec-
tion 48907.136 Crosby further argued that permitting the stu-
dents to distribute flyers and advertise in the school yearbook
did not constitute state action requiring constitutional scru-
tiny. 37 Since the students initiated and sponsored the activity,
Crosby said, the state did not risk creating the impression of
sponsoring religious ideas. Furthermore, Crosby argued, the
announcements planned by New Life could not have caused
religious indoctrination, which is the basis for Supreme Court
prohibitions against church-state entanglement.3 8  Students
132. Id. at 67-68, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47.
133. Id. at 71-72, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 547. "The inevitable consequence of the estab-
lishment clause when applied to religious ritual on school property is to retrict that
activity to preserve the wall between church and state." Id.
134. Id. at 68-69, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
135. Id. at 79, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 557: "[N]othing in Education Code section 48907
authorizes the prior restaint of any expression, religious or otherwise, unless it is
obscene or defamatory or contains 'material which so incites students as to create a
clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school premises or
the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial disruption of the orderly
operation of the school.' This advertisement met none of those criteria." Id.
(Crosby, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 74, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
137. Id. at 83-84, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60 (Crosby, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 85, 89-90, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 561, 564-65.
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could simply discard the flyers or avert their eyes from the ad
and suffer no ill effect.
Perumal indicates that although section 48907 assures stu-
dents greater freedom than the first amendment, it does not
confer an absolute right to expression. Leeb stands for the
same proposition. However, for rules restraining speech to
stand under the section, they must serve some important state
purpose, such as preventing tort liability or entanglement with
religion.139 Merely restricting dialogue on controversial topics
violates the section.
B. Differences in the Standards
1. What Speech May be Barred
California permits restricting student expression only if the
speech fits into specific categories. Obscene, libelous, or slan-
derous speech is flatly prohibited.1 41 Material inciting students
to break laws, disobey school rules, or disrupt school activities
may also be restrained.1 41 Hazelwood, in contrast, permits cen-
soring speech if the administrator's action serves any reason-
able pedagogical purpose. 14  The Hazelwood standard gives
minimal protection for student journalists, with almost unlim-
ited discretion to faculty and administration. The California
standard seeks to confine that discretion to instances deemed
appropriate to censor. However, courts agree that school au-
thorities retain broad discretion to impose academic discipline
on students who present offensive expression in conjunction
with class work.143 Although Matthew Fraser probably could
139. See, e.g., Hentoff, The Censored Valedictorian, Washington Post, July 2, 1988,
at A23, col. 1.
140. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). This creates familiar problems
with the definition of "obscenity." The United States Supreme Court has indicated
that protection of children requires applying a broader definition than that applica-
ble to adults. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (distribution of pornog-
raphy to minors); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech
regulated when broadcast at time minors would be listening); Bethel School Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (school can regulate merely offensive speech
when presented at school rally with minors in audience).
141. "Also prohibited shall be material which so incites students as to create a
clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school premises or
the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial disruption of the orderly
operation of the school." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
142. 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988).
143. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166; Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982);
Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 62, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (1988).
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not be prevented from wearing Cohen's jacket to public school
in California, if he offered it to a sewing class instructor he
might well receive an "F.
'144
2. Written Regulations
California requires school boards to adopt written guidelines
for the operation of student media.145 However, few schools
have complied, possibly since the statute vaguely defines the
guidelines. 46 The statute requires "reasonable provisions for
the time, place, and manner of conducting" expressive activi-
ties; however, it does not describe the rules schools should
adopt.147 This vagueness could lead to broad implementation
by schools, which may regulate extensively, as long as they
prohibit only speech listed in section 48907.148
The Hazelwood Court expressly rejected arguments for per-
mitting official school publications to be restricted only ac-
cording to written regulations.149 The Court claimed that
requiring such guidelines would unduly restrict the teaching
ability of educators by confining their decisions to narrow
144. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970). The Supreme Court upheld Co-
hen's first amendment right to wear a jacket bearing the phrase "Fuck the Draft."
The Court in Fraser noted that the first amendment protects students wearing
"Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket." Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164-65 (quoting
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
145. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
146. See Prior Restraint Note, supra note 16, at 1151 n.24. See also CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987):
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise freedom of
speech and of the press including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin
boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of but-
tons, badges, and other insignia, and the right of expression in official publi-
cations, whether or not such publications or other means of expression are
supported financially by the school, or by use of school facilities, except that
expression shall be prohibited which is obscene, libelous or slanderous.
Also prohibited shall be material which so incites students as to create a
clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on the school
premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial dis-
ruption of the orderly operation of the school.
147. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
148. Perumal, 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 69, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1988) (sustaining
regulations restricting all expression by off-campus "private clubs").
149. 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.6. The Hazelwood school district's regulations were ig-
nored by the majority, but the dissent strongly argued that the regulations repre-
sented an administration "promise" which was broken by Reynolds' censorship. Id.
at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
circumstances. 150
3. Prior Restraint
California flatly prohibits any prior restraint which is im-
posed to bar speech not otherwise proscribed by statute.'5 '
Put another way, prior restraints are permissible, but may be
used to bar only a limited, statutorily-defined class of
speech.'52 Hazelwood, in contrast, allows prior restraint and
any other regulation provided it "serves a legitimate pedagogi-
cal purpose."'5 3
4. Prior Justification of Censorship
Recognizing that students are entitled to an opportunity to
correct material before it is censored, California requires ad-
ministrators to show "justification without undue delay prior
to any limitation of student expression .... , This provision
presumes that restrictions on student expression are invalid
until demonstrated otherwise, which parallels the approach
used by federal courts until recently.' Before imposing prior
restraint in California, administrators must show justification.
Hazelwood requires no such notice; the Court presumes ad-
ministrative regulations are valid. 5 6
5. Sponsorship of Publication
California grants the same rights and imposes the same re-
strictions on student expression whether or not it occurs in an
"official school publication.' ' 57 However, section 48907 recog-
nizes that publication supervisors who are school faculty mem-
bers are not subordinate to student editors, and may control
publications to the extent provided by the statute.'58
150. Id. at 571 n.6. Although the Court did not consider whether "underground"
newspapers require equal deference to administrative judgment, it has indicated that
administrators must give greater latitude to non-sponsored publications distributed
on campus. Id. at 570 n.3; see Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667
(1973) (holding invalid a regulation on an "underground" newspaper).
151. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1987).
152. The validity of § 48907 was sustained against constitutional attack. Leeb, 198
Cal. App. 3d 47, 54, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (1988).
153. 108 S. Ct. at 571.
154. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
155. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
156. 108 S. Ct. at 571.
157. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
158. Id. at para. 3.
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Hazelwood, in contrast, drew a sharp distinction between of-
ficial publications and non-sponsored expression.159 The Court
was motivated by the need for schools to disassociate them-
selves from objectionable speech by imposing a higher stan-
dard of expression on sponsored publications.160 Therefore,
while Hazelwood permits regulation of sponsored speech, it is
inapplicable to unsponsored speech.
6. The Age Continuum
Courts have suggested that the same rights are not available
to all students, regardless of age.1 61 Federal courts have ap-
plied different standards to students of different ages in sev-
eral contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has permitted
more stringent regulation of obscene materials distributed to
minors, 62 applying a variable standard to children. In Tinker,
one of the children who a wore black armband in defiance of
school regulations was eight years old.'6 3 Although the child
did not participate as a plaintiff in the case, Justice Black, in
his dissent, interpreted Tinker to extend "the right of school
pupils to express their political views all the way from kinder-
garten to high school. ' 164 However, there are no reported
cases of grade-school students or their parents challenging
school newspaper regulations on constitutional grounds. Pre-
sumably, this is because few judges would question the legiti-
macy of schools assuming control in loco parentis of younger
children. 65
Conversely, no state may control expression by college stu-
dents in either an official school publication or an "under-
ground" newspaper.'66 State-sponsored college papers are
159. 108 S. Ct. at 569.
160. Id. at 570.
161. Commentators agree. For an analysis of all federal cases in this area since
Tinker, see Avery & Simpson, supra note 6.
162. Ginsberg v. State of N.Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1966); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
163. 393 U.S. 503, 516 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. For a concise rejection of the policy arguments favoring variable first amend-
ment standards as applied to children, see Letwin, Regulation of Underground
Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22 UCLA L. REV. 141, 197
(1974) (analysis and rejection of variable first amendment standard for children);
Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEO.
L.J. 37, 53-58 (1970) (arguing that classroom discipline requires a strict standard for
students).
166. See Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). There are
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usually deemed public forums, which must accept advertising
from all groups;167 thus, they are subject to a more expansive
right of access than commerical newspapers, which may in-
voke the first amendment when publishing all (or none) of the
news that is fit to print.168
7. Private Schools
May Hazelwood and section 48907 be extended to private in-
stitutions? The California statute applies only to "students of
the public schools," possibly reflecting legislative misgivings
about the constitutionality of imposing legislative restrictions
on private institutions.169 The federal standard is uncertain.
The distinction between public and private schools was ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court as early as 1925,
when the Court struck down an Oregon statute which re-
quired children to attend only public schools in Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters. ° Although the Court's reasoning in Pierce was
based on parental rights, the case demonstrates that, in some
circumstances, whether a school is public or private is not con-
stitutionally significant. Some commentators17" ' and courts 17 2
few areas of collegiate expression, possibly none, into which government may in-
trude. See American Future Systems v. State Univ. of New York, 841 F.2d 1207 (2d
Cir. 1988) (Under the first amendment, colleges may not bar students in on-campus
dormitory from inviting guests to their rooms.).
167. See San Diego Committee Against Registration and the Draft v. Governing
Board, 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); see also supra note 31.
168. The Supreme Court has held, without ever revisiting the question, that the
general public is not entitled to access to commercial newspapers on demand. See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
169. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
170. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
171. One commentator argued the opposite, contending that because a student's
relationship with a private school is based on contract, a private school should have
complete discretion to regulate student expression. See Annotation, Validity, Under
Federal Constitution, of Public School or State College Regulation of Student News-
papers, Magazines, and Other Publications-Federal Cases, 16 A.L.R. FED. 182, 187
n.7 (1974 & Supp. 1987). This view appears to have been substantially eroded in
Georgetown Univ. v. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center, 536
A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987), writ of mandamus stayed 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5214 (Dec. 31,
1987), stay order vacated 108 S. Ct. 688 (1988), denial of motion for reconsideration
108 S. Ct. 768 (1988).
172. See, e.g., Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). In Isenbarger,
parochial school students brought an action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982), alleging that their expulsion from school deprived them of their tui-
tion payments without due process of law. 445 F.2d at 413. The students argued un-
successfully that since the private school had received a state commission akin to
accreditation, their expulsion constituted state action. Id. The court noted that the
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have disagreed, but the Court reinforced this view recently
when it upheld the enforcement of a writ ordering
Georgetown University, a private Roman Catholic college, to
accord homosexual student groups treatment equal to other
recognized campus groups.
17 3
V
Expression Available in Student Media After
Hazelwood
Student free expression rights are protected by Hazelwood
only when a school administrator censors without any reason-
able pedagogical purpose.'74 In California, student expressive
rights are defined by section 48907, but courts have inter-
preted the statute differently depending on the circum-
stances. Although California appeals courts have noted the
inapplicability of Hazelwood,76 in the future judges will proba-
bly refer to its rationale when applying section 48907 to differ-
ent media. The following section examines student expressive
rights in various media following the Hazelwood and Califor-
nia approaches.
A. Symbolic or "Pure" Speech
The speech expressed by the Tinker students represented a
kind of first amendment minimum; wearing armbands was
"closely akin to 'pure speech' which [the Supreme Court has
held] is entitled to comprehensive protection under the first
amendment.' ' 7 7 After Hazelwood, students retain the same
freedom of expression through symbolic or "pure" speech they
have had since the dawn of Tinker. Hazelwood distinguished
Tinker carefully and confined its holding to school-sponsored
speech.78
students' claim could be valid only if the school was under far greater state control.
Id. at 414.
173. Georgetown Univ., 108 S. Ct. at 688. See supra note 171.
174. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988).
175. See, e.g., Leeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 55, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
(1988); Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 70,
243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1988); see also supra notes 107-39 and accompanying text.
176. Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 54, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
177. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
178. "The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech [as in Tinker] is different from the question whether the
First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote student speech." 108 S.
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In California, student expressive rights to pure speech are
codified in section 48907, which protects expression through
"the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia . . ." as
well as other media.17 9 No California court has addressed a
pure speech restriction since section 48907 was enacted in
1977.18° Therefore, it seems safe to assume that unless school
authorities can show "without undue delay" that a particular
symbolic expression "so incites students as to create a clear
and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on
school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations,
or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the
school,"'' all symbolic expression is protected. These provi-
sions, drafted to exclude incidents like that in Tinker, create a
heavy presumption of the validity of student symbolic speech.
B. Lectures and Oratory Before Student Audiences
A year before Hazelwood, the Supreme Court decided Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, approving limits on sexual
innuendo in a speech delivered by a student to his peers. 8 2
Fraser was approved by the Hazelwood Court. 3 Read to-
gether, these cases suggest that school authorities may broadly
censor student speeches to protect younger members of the
audience. At least concerning obscenity, Fraser confirmed
that a variable standard applies. Hazelwood emphasized the
school's role as sponsor of student assemblies and speeches in
applying a stricter standard to such speech. 8 4
In California, the scope of permitted restrictions on student
oratory has narrowed radically. More than seventy years ago,
a Fresno school student was expelled for criticizing adminis-
trators during a school assembly. Both trial and appeals
courts sustained his expulsion as a reasonable exercise of
school disciplinary authority. 5 That case embodied the edu-
Ct. at 569. See also Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d. 801 (4th Cir. 1988): "[a] school
mascot or symbol bears the stamp of approval of the school ... authorities are free
to disassociate the school from such a symbol because of educational concerns."
179. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
180. Only three courts have construed section 48907. See supra notes 18-22 and
accompanying text.
181. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
182. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The Court upheld the suspension of a student for deliv-
ering a speech containing sexual innuendos at a school assembly. Id.
183. 108 S. Ct. at 570.
184. Id.; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
185. Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915).
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cational philosophy which prevailed early in this century.186
Aside from barring slander, section 48907 does not expressly
mention student oratory, except by guaranteeing overall free-
dom of speech.8 7 However, California courts recently de-
clared that section 48907 preserves broad free speech rights for
students except in very limited circumstances.8 Expression
like the speech in Fraser would not be proscribed. Leeb v. De-
Long dealt with purportedly obscene matter,' 89 and the court
held only actionably obscene or defamatory material could be
censored.190 Therefore, merely offensive or sexually sugges-
tive speech, like that in Fraser, may not be restricted under
the lenient California standard.
C. School-sponsored Publications
Federal law with respect to school-sponsored publications is
controlled by Hazelwood.'9' Administrators may censor any
material, provided their restrictions serve a legitimate peda-
gogical purpose. 91
In California, section 48907, Leeb, and Perumal control, and
may be distilled into four rules: (1) purportedly defamatory
material must be actionably tortious to be restricted; 93 (2)
schools may not publish religious material if the action vio-
lates the establishment clause according to the Lemon test; 94
(3) prior restraints other than those implementing (1) and (2)
are invalid; 95 and (4) otherwise, only articles that (a) create
the clear and present danger that students will commit viola-
tions of law or school rules, or (b) substantially disrupt school
operations, may be barred. 96 Apart from these rules, no re-
striction of school-sponsored student speech is permitted in
California.
186. See Hafen, supra note 2, at 670-77; J. MENACKER, SCHOOL LAW 101 (1987).
187. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
188. See, e.g., Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 60, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (1988).
189. Id. at 50-51, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96. See also supra notes 107-27 and accom-
panying text.
190. Id. at 60, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
191. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
192. Id. at 571.
193. Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
194. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Perumal, 198 Cal. App. 3d at
73-75, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (upheld censoring both leaflets and yearbook advertise-
ment of religious group).
195. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
196. Id. at para. 1.
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D. Non-school-sponsored Publications
The Hazelwood Court carefully distinguished sponsored and
non-school-sponsored speech, holding that schools may exer-
cise greater control over sponsored speech.197 The Court did
not decide how much control schools may impose over non-
sponsored speech, because that question was not before the
Court, but it left intact the principle that schools must tolerate
non-sponsored speech under almost any circumstances. Some
of the circumstances which would justify restricting under-
ground newspapers include those set out in Tinker: material
disruption of classwork, substantial disorder, and invasion of
the rights of others.1 98
In California, section 48907 explicitly states that students re-
tain press rights "whether or not . . .publications or other
means of expression are supported financially by the school or
by use of school facilities ... '.199 Thus, section 48907's limits
on administrative intervention apply equally to underground
publications. The Leeb standard also applies to underground
newspapers; only actionable defamatory material may be ex-
cised from underground publications. Perumal dealt explicitly
with non-sponsored speech, and allowed censorship where en-
tanglement with religion would occur. Generally, absent over-
riding constitutional concerns, section 48907 directs that
California administrators may not regulate non-sponsored
newspapers.
E. Theatrical Productions
Before Hazelwood, only one federal court had addressed stu-
dent expression in a school-sponsored theatrical production. °°
In upholding a school's cancellation of a production, the Third
Circuit held that schools may regulate the content of school
plays.20 ' The court held that such regulation is permitted be-
cause the audience might reasonably believe the school ap-
proved the content of the play. Hazelwood echoed this
197. 108 S. Ct at 570 n.3.
198. Id. at 570; Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); Papish v. University of Missouri,
410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973). But see Bystrom v. Fridley High School, Indep. School Dist.
No. 14, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) (regulations, including prior restraints, on under-
ground newspaper distributed on school grounds upheld).
199. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
200. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
201. Id. The play in question, "Pippin," involved scenes depicting simulated sex-
ual activity. Seyfried, 512 F. Supp. 235, 236-37 (D. Del. 1981).
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rationale and included student drama productions in its hold-ing. Therefore, all elements of the above discussion of
school-sponsored speech apply equally to theatrical
productions.
Section 48907 does not include theatrical productions in its
list of expressive activities guaranteed to students, and other
paragraphs confine the section's scope to written school publi-
cations. °3 California courts have not addressed the question
of whether theatrical productions are among free expression
rights protected. The argument can be made that the spirit of
section 48907 is to extend unfettered expressive rights to stu-
dents, but such an argument ignores the many limitations on
expressive rights in the statute.20 4 The narrow language of the
section indicates legislative intent to confine expressive rights
to publications and other written or symbolic media. Further-
more, because dramatic productions are subject to many more
school-imposed limits than newspapers, it is unlikely that
courts would extend section 48907 to theatrical productions.
F. Radio Stations
Many high schools and colleges sponsor noncommercial ra-
dio stations.2 05  Broadcasting has been recognized as speech
protected by the first amendment.20 6 However, the effect of
Hazelwood on public school broadcasters will probably be min-
imal. Although California law does not list broadcast stations
among media available to public school students,0 7 state law is
202. "[School] standards . .. may be higher than those demanded by some news-
paper publishers or theatrical producers in the 'real' world .... " 108 S. Ct. at 570.
203. Section 48907 provides that school boards shall adopt "a written publications
code." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 3 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). The
section describes responsibilities of "student editors of official school publications"
and the role of the "journalism adviser," icl at para. 3 (emphasis added), and defines
"official school publications" to include only the product of "journalism, newspaper,
yearbook, or writing classes .... Id. at para. 5 (emphasis added).
204. Some prior restraints are permitted; obscene or libelous speech is barred, dis-
ruptive speech is prohibited, and faculty supervision of official publications is man-
dated. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
205. In 1984, 982 noncommercial educational FM stations were licensed to schools,
colleges, and public interest groups, and an additional 183 stations were authorized
but were not operating. 54 FCC ANN. REP. 88 (1984).
206. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969). See L. TRIBE, supra
note 28, at 1001-10.
207. "Students . . . shall have the right to . . . the use of bulletin boards, the
distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and
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preempted by federal broadcasting regulation.2 0 8 Student ex-
pression in the broadcast media is governed not by Hazelwood
but by the Federal Communications Commission and its
rules.
209
But Hazelwood may provide insight into the future attitude
of the Supreme Court toward broadcasting involving children.
At least since 1978, the United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that broadcast media may be regulated to protect
children.210 In Hazelwood, the Court charted the same course
by holding that "a school must be able to take into account the
emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining
whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics . . . .,,21" Therefore, in a future case involving restric-
tions on expression by student broadcasters, the Court is
likely to uphold FCC rules even stricter than those sanctioned
by the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.1 2
VI
Closing the Loopholes in Hazelwood and
California Law
The standards announced by Hazelwood and section 48907
share two flaws. Both standards are subject to abuse from
overly broad interpretation and both undermine the effective-
ness of student newspapers as an educational tool by failing to
provide the incentive of fair notice to participating students.
other insignia, and the right of expression in official publications .... " CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48907, para. 1 (West Supp. 1987).
208. Where Congress validly decides to "occupy the field" for the federal govern-
ment, federal law supersedes state law. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 497. Two
elements are required: a valid basis of congressional power (in the case of broadcast-
ing, the commerce clause), and a pervasive scheme of federal regulation. Id. at 497-
501.
209. The FCC has authority to promulgate rules, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154, which are
codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ .1-19 (1988).
210. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upheld FCC determination
that a station could be sanctioned for broadcasting indecent words during the day);
but see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 936-38; Ingber, Review Essay, 56 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 187, 200-01 (1987) (excerpting S. INGBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN MODERN
GARB: RETAINING SYSTEM LEGITIMACY-A REVIEW ESSAY OF LUCAS POWE'S AMERI-
CAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987)). See also Frisby v. Schultz,
108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988) (parents' authority to control household as alternative
ground for similar decision).
211. 108 S. Ct. at 570.
212. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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The following section discusses these flaws and a possible
remedy.
A. Overbreadth
By declaring in Hazelwood that administrators may censor
student publications according to "any legitimate pedagogical
concerns," the Supreme Court chose the broadest possible
standard consistent with other cases outlawing state indoctri-
nation of particular views.213 Critics charge that Hazelwood
gives school principals license to censor speech with which
they simply disagree.214  Other commentators note that
teacher associations and watchdog groups will prevent admin-
istrators from being overzealous. 215 Nonetheless, viewed in
any light, the Court's holding gives extraordinary discretion to
school administrators.
California's statutory scheme-although narrowly phrased-
may be circumvented, as demonstrated in Leeb and
Perumal.1 6 Section 48907 does not provide internal sanctions
for its violation. Although the statute requires implementa-
tion through written guidelines,217 schools have been slow to
adopt such guidelines, and no statutory penalty exists for
schools failing to adopt guidelines.21 8
B. Lack of Incentive
Furthermore, the federal and California approaches do not
provide protections which would encourage students to partici-
pate in the student press. Hazelwood allows administrators to
censor without prior notice to students that a particular story
is objectionable, aside from whatever guidance is offered in
the journalism class.21 9 Thus, Hazelwood may chill student
speech because students must avoid controversial stories or
213. 108 S. Ct. at 571. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (school may not cast "pall of orthodoxy" over classroom).
214. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 574 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wicker, The Wrong
Lesson, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1988, at A19, col. 6; Taylor, supra note 94.
215. Katz, No Need to Fear College Principals, Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1988, at
A18, col. 5.
216. See Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988); Perumal, 198 Cal.
App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988). See also supra notes 107-39 and accompanying
text.
217. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 2 (West Supp. 1987). Prior Restraint Note,
supra note 16, at 1151.
218. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
219. Indeed, faculty guidance was inadequate in Hazelwood: the principal cen-
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risk censorship.22 °
Section 48907 requires administrators to offer justification of
censorship "without undue delay. 22 1 Like Hazelwood, how-
ever, it effectively allows prior restraint without notice to
students.222
The very vagueness of the California approach may make it
difficult for administrators and courts to apply.223 Administra-
tors know that errors of judgment may provoke court chal-
lenges by students. Courts, presented with a vague standard
containing no legislated sanction, may be ill-equipped to decide
whether a school's actions meet the standard. The Leeb case
presents such a problem; the court had to read between the
lines in deciding that California's statutory command permit-
ting censorship of "libelous or slanderous" material includes
only actionable defamatory material.224 A principal or student
presented with the statute and the offending article might
have few guideposts to make such an inference.
Both the Hazelwood and California standards may cause
frustration among students and deter participation in the stu-
dent newspaper. This result is unfortunate, considering that
unfettered expression of creativity is critical for the budding
student writer, especially in the classroom. 25
C. Written Guidelines as a Solution
A solution to both concerns is modification of Hazelwood
and section 48907 to permit prior restraint or other censorship
only pursuant to specific written guidelines adopted by schools
or school districts. Using guidelines could provide several im-
sored an article although the journalism teacher had judged the article fit to print.
108 S. Ct. at 565-66.
220. On the other hand, it may encourage students to produce quality work, be-
cause bad writing may be rejected by administrators. See O'Keeffe, supra note 94, at
3, col. 4.
221. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907, para. 4 (West Supp. 1987).
222. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). The circumstances in which
prior restraint is permissible are limited, but they are vaguely worded. Id. The Leeb
court gave little attention to this argument. See Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 61-62, 243
Cal. Rptr. at 502, 503.
223. Leeb, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 54, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
224. Id. at 60, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
225. Arguing that the Hazelwood majority betrayed the students and the aim of
education, Justice Brennan wrote: "the [students] of Hazelwood East expected a civ-
ics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today." 108 S. Ct. at 580 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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provements over current law. First, guidelines would provide
students with notice of what is objectionable so that fewer dis-
putes would arise. Second, guidelines could provide an inter-
nal method of dispute resolution, avoiding the cost and time of
litigation. Finally, guidelines would promote creativity among
student journalists by removing the threat of spontaneous,
blanket censorship or prior restraint. The Supreme Court re-
fused to require administrators to comply with written guide-
lines because. it feared guidelines would "unduly constrain the
ability of educators to educate. '226 Even this hurdle can be
overcome by properly drafted guidelines, as discussed below.
Although many courts have reviewed instances of adminis-
trative censorship and have examined specific school regula-
tions on student 'expression,221 few courts have indicated
precisely how guidelines should be constructed in the fu-
ture.228 The Fourth Circuit, perhaps tiring of the number of
high school free speech cases crowding its chambers,229 set out
a detailed list of the attributes of constitutionally valid prior
restraint guidelines in Baughman v. Freienmuth:
230
(1) Precise criteria sufficiently spelling out what is forbidden
so that a reasonably intelligent student will know what he
may and may not write;
(2) A definition of "distribution" and its application to the
dissemination of different kinds of material;
(3) Provision for prompt approval or disapproval of what is
submitted;
(4) Specification of whether students may distribute material
if administrators fail to act promptly, and
(5) An adequate and prompt appeals procedure.231
226. 108 S. Ct. at 571, n.6.
227. For a collection of the cases, see Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Consti-
tution, of Public School or State College Regulation of Student Newspapers,
Magazines, and Other Publications-Federal Cases, 16 A.L.R. FED. 182 (1974 & Supp.
1987).
228. An analysis of administrative guidelines is provided in Bystrom v. Fridley
High School, Indep. School Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987). See also Fu-
jishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (striking guidelines permit-
ting prior restraint); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971)
(deferring to school authorities' judgment as to what is publishable).
229. "This is another freedom of speech case in the high school context," the
court wrote in Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1973) (empha-
sis added). To date, the Fourth Circuit has heard the most cases reviewing school-
imposed systems of prior restraint on student expression. See Avery & Simpson,
supra note 6 (circuit-by-circuit catalog of opinions).
230. Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1351.
231. Id.
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Several commentators and courts have approved of this
model,232 but some critics view any system of prior restraint as
too' restrictive.233  Although the Baughman scheme provides
for precise terminology and fair procedural treatment of stu-
dents, it can be improved. Specifically, to avoid surprise, stu-
dents should be entitled to know who has authority to censor,
the appeals procedure should specify what is "adequate," and a
procedure should be defined for interpreting the guidelines
when novel situations arise on short notice.
Therefore, school guidelines should specifically prescribe:
(1) Notice of the restraint procedure:
(a) when and by what procedure administrators will ex-
amine articles before publication, and
(b) who has authority to do so;
(c) a time limit for administrative review, and the effect
on a student's right to publish if administrators exceed the
time limit;
(d) what curricular and non-curricular activities are sub-
ject to censorship;
(2) Standards of censorship:
(a) what words or topics will trigger a prior restraint;
(b) by what process a student may voluntarily submit an
article to determine whether it is objectionable;
232. See, e.g., Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Avery
& Simpson, supra note 6.
233. The Hazelwood court feared that requiring written regulations for adminis-
tration of a school-sponsored activity would "unduly constrain the ability of educa-
tors to educate." 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.6. However, the Court reserved the question as
to non-school-sponsored activities. Id. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
In the private sector, the Student Press Law Center, based in Washington, D.C., is
a strong critic of prior restraint provisions in student publications guidelines. The
Center, an independent watchdog group funded by journalism teachers and students,
first published model student publications guidelines in 1978, and those guidelines
flatly bar prior restraint. STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Vol. 1, No. 1, Win-
ter 1978-79, at 34. The preamble of the Center's current guidelines claims that court
decisions indicate schools may be able to shield themselves from liability by omitting
prior restraint from publications guidelines. STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT,
Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1987-88, at 35. The guidelines provide, in part:
VII. PRIOR RESTRAINT
No student publication, whether nonschool-sponsored or official, will be
reviewed by school administrators prior to distribution or withheld from
distribution. The school assumes no liability for the content of any student
publication, and urges all student journalists to recognize that with editorial
control comes responsibility, including the responsibility to follow profes-
sional journalism standards.
Id. at 37.
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(c) provision for "cure"; that is, what process may be fol-
lowed to render the article fit for print;
(3) Appeal procedure:
(a) what provisions are available;
(b) a time limit by which the appeal must be heard; and
(c) the effect of administrative delay; and
(4) A procedure for convening a quasi-judicial publications re-
view committee, distinct from the panel hearing appeals
under these guidelines, which would:
(a) determine whether a proposed article or publication
fits existing definitions set out in the guidelines; and
(b) recommend changes for conformance with the
guidelines.2 34
This proposal has several advantages over Baughman, Ha-
zelwood, and section 48907. First, the guidelines preserve ad-
ministrative discretion to censor, without allowing censorship
absent notice to students. As new situations justifying censor-
ship develop, students can seek advice from the review board,
and in the event of an adverse decision, administrators need
only revise the regulations to provide notice. By spelling out
specific topics, words, or situations which will trigger censor-
ship, administrators will make clear the pedagogical goals of
the student media, while providing fair notice of potential vio-
lations. This notice, and the provisions for arbitration and ap-
peal of disputes, should prevent litigation, unless
administrators draft constitutionally invalid regulations.23 5
Furthermore, the proposal requires describing the appeal pro-
cedure in detail, defining which administrators may censor
publications, listing which media or activities may be censored,
and describing how students may remedy defective articles.
These provisions provide fair notice and should prevent
problems from arising.
Using written guidelines would also assist court interpreta-
tion of restrictions. The court would have before it the spe-
234. See Burch v. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (specification
of these limits for administrative action held to be required by Constitution).
Fairness also demands that students not be subject to such guidelines without ac-
tual notice of their provisions. Therefore, the guidelines developed should be distrib-
uted in the student handbook and students should be required to sign an
acknowledgement of receipt. See STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Vol. 9, No.
1, Winter 1987-88, at 37, provision VIII.
235. Schools could avoid this situation by retaining counsel while drafting their
regulations. This would eliminate the need to seek legal advice every time a poten-
tially litigious situation arose.
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cific situations judged impermissible by the school, as well as
decisions made by the internal review board, and could decide
easily whether the regulations comport with the Constitution.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has changed constitutional standards of
student free expression according to evolving educational the-
ory. The Court's view of the state's permissible role in re-
stricting student expression has gone from expansive to
narrow and back, culminating in its grant of broad discretion
to school authorities in Hazelwood.
California, however, has given greater freedom of expres-
sion to public school students, but the handful of courts which
have construed California's legislation have expressed only
guarded enthusiasm for its provisions. Consequently, the fu-
ture of California student press rights is uncertain: if courts
follow the example of Leeb and Perumal, the result will be
ever narrower interpretations of section 48907 which could re-
duce student press freedom to the minimal level guaranteed
by Hazelwood.
A thicket of rules and cases entangle high school student
media, but several uniform principles apply to all. Both Hazel-
wood and California law permit restricting far more student
expression than is necessary to maintain order in the schools
and teach journalism effectively. Requiring school administra-
tors to act according to written regulations would preserve ed-
ucators' discretion while allowing students to learn the full
responsibilities of the first amendment through using it
responsibly.
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